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In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 (Oct. 3, 2013)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: JUVENILE COURT AUTHORITY
Summary
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether the juvenile court has authority under NRS
62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision
pursuant to NRS 62C.200 without the written approval of the district attorney; and (2) whether
the juvenile court's discretion in overseeing a juvenile matter is limited by the authority granted
under the Nevada Revised Statutes.
Disposition
The juvenile court’s authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) permits it to dismiss a petition
and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only when the requirements of NRS 62C.200 have
been met, including the requirement that the district attorney give written approval for placement
of the juvenile under informal supervision where the acts alleged in the petition would be a
felony or gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Furthermore, the provisions of NRS Title
5 limit the juvenile court’s discretionary power to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile
justice matters.
Factual and Procedural History
In September 2011, the state charged Steven P., a juvenile, with burglary (a felony) and
conspiracy to commit burglary (a gross misdemeanor). In January 2012, the juvenile court
accepted a plea agreement that dismissed the burglary allegation in exchange for Steven
admitting the conspiracy allegation. Based on the report of a probation officer assigned to
Steven, the State requested that Steven be made “a delinquent ward of the court” and placed on
formal probation. Concerned with ordering formal probation, the court reserved ruling on the
State’s petition.
Approximately one month later, no decision had been made. In the State’s resulting
motion for adjudication, the State indicated that Steven’s charges could be deferred and
dismissed upon his successful completion of probation. Furthermore, “the State contended that
pursuant to NRS 62C.200-.230, deferred adjudication required approval from the district attorney
prior to the juvenile court allowing informal supervision.”
The juvenile court did not obtain the district attorney’s written approval prior to
dismissing the State’s petition and referring Steven for informal supervision. The juvenile court
interpreted NRS 62C.230(1)(a) as not requiring such approval. The State now appeals the
juvenile court’s order.
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Discussion
The juvenile court does not have authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency
petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of the district
attorney
The issue here of the juvenile court’s authority pursuant to NRS 62C.230(1)(a) is a matter
of statutory interpretation, and is therefore subject to de novo review.2 Statutory interpretations
must be rooted in a statute’s plain meaning as indicated by the statute’s express language “unless
it is clear that the plain meaning was not intended.”3 The Court will “avoid statutory
interpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous.”4 Further, the Court will enforce
the statute as written where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous.5
NRS 62C.230(1)(a)
NRS 62C.230(1)(a) states that “[i]f the district attorney files a petition with the juvenile
court, the juvenile court may . . . [d]ismiss the petition without prejudice and refer the child to
the probation officer for informal supervision pursuant to NRS 62C.200.”6 The term “pursuant
to” serves as a restrictive term in this construction. Hence, the Court concluded that under the
plain language of NRS 62C.230(1)(a), “the juvenile court may dismiss the State’s petition and
refer a juvenile for informal supervision only upon the juvenile court’s determination that the
requirements of NRS 62C.200 have been met.”
NRS 62C.200
“NRS 62C.200 includes preconditions for a juvenile to be placed under informal
supervision of a probation officer.” This list includes a requirement that “the district attorney
gives written approval for placement of the child under informal supervision, if any of the acts
alleged in the complaint are unlawful acts that would have constituted a gross misdemeanor or
felony if committed by an adult.”7 From the “plain language” of this statute, the Court concluded
that such written approval is required.
Furthermore the Court concluded that where NRS 62C.100(1) uses the restrictive term
“pursuant to NRS 62C.200” to outline a probation officer’s responsibilities in placing a child
under informal supervision, it is not to be construed as requiring the probation officer, rather than
the juvenile court, to obtain such written approval. To ensure that the requirements of NRS
62C.200 have been met, NRS 62C.100(1) cannot be read as extinguishing the harmony between
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the sections of the statute. “To hold otherwise would render the restrictive language in NRS
62C.230(1)(a) meaningless.”
NRS 62C.230(1)(b) does not eliminate the requirement of written approval from the district
attorney
That NRS 62C.230(1)(b) expressly states that the juvenile court is required to obtain the
approval of the district attorney, while NRS 62C.230(1)(a) has instead a restrictive reference to
NRS 62C.200 is of no consequence in determining the need for the juvenile court to obtain the
district attorney’s approval. “NRS 62C.230(1)(a) refers to, and thus incorporates the statutory
language of, NRS 62C.200.” Thus the juvenile court must comply with the provisions of NRS
62C.200 in order to exercise its authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a). “A statute by reference
made a part of another law becomes incorporated in it and remains so as long as the former is in
force.”8
The juvenile court’s authority is statutorily limited
The Court reiterated its previous holding that “the juvenile court system is a creation of
statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute.”9 This
assertion is further supported by NRS 62B.010(4) which maintains that “a judge of the juvenile
court has all the powers and duties set forth in this title,” and NRS 62B.300(2), states that the
juvenile court must exercise its “jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of” Nevada’s Juvenile
Justice Code. Consequently, “the juvenile court’s discretion to dismiss the State’s delinquency
petition and refer Steven for informal supervision was expressly limited by statute.” Therefore,
the Court concluded that “the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority here.”
Conclusion
The juvenile court cannot usurp NRS 62C.200’s requirement that the district attorney
provide written approval before a juvenile charged with what would be a felony or gross
misdemeanor if committed by an adult can be placed under the informal supervision of a
probation officer. Additionally, the provisions of NRS Title 5 statutorily limit the juvenile
court’s exercise of authority in overseeing juvenile justice matters. The Court reversed the
juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
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